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Prologue
A fearful kingdom of eternal silence, loneliness, and darkness! Unutterable horror overtook me at
this sight.
Immanuel Kant, Carazan’s Dream

In a decrepit cottage in the middle of the American badlands there once lived an old,
destitute couple. The husband was so sick that he could not walk or talk and he was taken care of
by a nurse when the wife could afford to pay her. Every day he got sicker and the wife more
desperate. She was so desperate and alone that she started hearing voices and cutting off parts of
her own body. At learning this one day, the two grown children of the forlorn couple, Michael,
who was married with two kids, and Louise, unmarried and childless, decided to come home and
see what they could do. When they arrived, they no quicker realized their helplessness than they
began to hear and see fearful things as well. By the time they realized that their isolation from each
other was the cause of this horrific fate, it was too late.
This is the plot of film The Dark and the Wicked, released in 2020. “Dark forces” are
taking over the people in the house and things just get worse and worse. First, the mother dies, then
the nurse, and Louise, who has nothing and no one left, hinges her entire hope of existence on her
brother Michael, who tries as he can to stay sane and support her over the days of ordeals that
unfurl one after the other revealing fresh nightmares at every corner. One night, such is the evil
that creeps that Michael sees no alternative for survival left: he takes the car and races home to his
wife and kids, leaving Louise behind, who now only has her near-comatose father to take care of.
In the moment she realizes that her brother, who promised he would not leave her, is nowhere to be
found, Louise, gasping for air, takes the old phone attached to the wall of the sad bedraggled
kitchen and calls him over and over, getting no response.
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The horrific climax of the film is when Michael finally answers the phone and tells his sister he
is on the road driving away from the house, and in a peak of panic and agony Louise realizes how
utterly alone she is. “Michael!”, “Michael!” she screams while squatting on the kitchen floor. The
last person to whom she could speak, in whom she could see herself reflected and who could
harbor her love, is gone. In the absence of this subject, only one fate is left for Louise. The house is
now empty but for the shell of her father, whom she nevertheless cannot abandon to the same fate
to which Michael left her. As she begs her father not to leave her too, he takes his last breath and
the floor creeks in tension for a moment. In the silence of having no one to speak to, the evil
patiently waiting outside the door finds just the room to come in and Louise, finally untethered
from all bonds of human connection, is taken by the horrible eternal.
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Introduction
In late September 2020, The National Gallery of Art in Washington D.C., who was
responsible for developing the exhibition Philip Guston Now, issued a statement saying the show
would be indefinetly postponed. Information had already been released stating that the
international exhibition, originally meant to open at the Tate Modern in February 2021, would be
delayed for up to four years. The essence of the justification for the postponement in the American
Museum’s press release was the following: “We are postponing the exhibition until a time at which
we think that the powerful message of social and racial justice that is at the center of Philip
Guston's work can be more clearly interpreted. […] We feel it is necessary to reframe our
programming and, in this case, step back, and bring in additional perspectives and voices to shape
how we present Guston's work to our public.”1
It is not often that an exhibition featuring a deceased painter’s work causes such uproar; but
with exponential intensity after it was postponed, the situation took hold of the national news and
the conversations on social media, even beyond the scope of museum and art professionals. The
more palpable reason for the postponement seems to have been, according to multiple publications,
that the institutions feared pushback against racial and social insensitivity given that Guston’s
paintings often feature white hooded figures, in reference to the Ku Klux Klan. The National
Gallery’s statement, in turn, quickly generated a unified and forceful response from various sectors
of the art world in a position against the decision to postpone. As the controversy grew, cues to its
cultural causes began to surface.

The National Gallery of Art Directors, “Philip Guston Now, Statement from Directors,” updated September 21,
2020. https://www.nga.gov/press/exh/5235.html. Note: the website shows the original date of the statement as June
27, 2019, however, that statement did not contain announcement of the postponement. The date of the
announcement is the date in September 2020, used here.
1
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Both the museum’s decision and the response to it had an element of the unexpected.
Guston’s body of work was not new to the art scene or the art public. The artist, who died in 1980,
had already been challenging viewers with his imagery of hooded figures since his return to
figurative painting in the late 1960’s. Therefore, a question appeared as to why this exhibition that
had itself been years in the making, caused such confusion and outrage on so many sides of the
artworld and beyond, seemingly out of nowhere.
Some reasons are left implicit but may be spelled out for clarity’s sake. The United States
had internally faced growing public unrest over the past several years on several fronts. When
Barack Obama was elected to the White House the country was experiencing the worst financial
crisis in nearly a century. The story is well-known: he ran a campaign under the banner of a
hopeful future based on change. Indeed, the economic downfall was curbed and the economy
recovered some of its standards, but nothing changed. The financial institutions singularly
responsible for the crisis suffered no consequences, the unequal distribution of wealth remained the
same, the people who lost everything during the crisis were not aided in any significant way, and
the underlining racial-economic inequalities persisted. In the meantime, the country continued its
trend of ethnic diversification where other minorities grew and the white population shrunk in
comparison. The less well-off white population, in turn, saw the basis of their socio-economic
identity wane as manufacturing and energy sector jobs diminished, and a once solid working class
to which they belonged lost its definition.
Following Obama’s election, a surprising number of public figures had mused that the
country might be entering a post-racial phase. In large part thanks to the reasons above, it quickly
became clear that was far from the truth, and Donald Trump’s election can certainly be seen as
evidence. Adding to this broader scenario, the months preceding the NGA’s statement, formed the
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specific conjecture that finally resulted in the decision to postpone. Over the first two decades of
the millennium, the development of certain technologies had allowed the nation’s law enforcement
the expanded implementation of body cameras on policemen and the civilian population’s
increased access to mobile recording devices, namely through smartphones. Social media had
become the primary form of mass communication encompassing almost the whole of the political
spectrum, and the content produced by its users found significant freedom of circulation there. As
a result, the stories and images of violence, both physical and psychological, that minority
communities and the Black community especially, had suffered since the beginning of the United
State’s history was disseminated within that field of high tension. While there was nothing new
about the exploitation of and violence against the Black community and other ethnic minorities,
this specific conjecture created another moment of national political embattlement. Several
murders of Black civilians by the police, among them of Eric Garner, George Floyd, and Breonna
Taylor, either caught on camera and/or shared on social media, therefore, became a powerful spark
that generated widespread and heterogenous protest, but also more political animosity. As both
extremities of the political spectrum became more vociferous the nation reached and maintained a
startling, though not unprecedented, degree of cultural and political division and an arena that in
retrospect was already dowsed in gasoline finally caught fire. Historically, there were plenty of
more attuned thinkers who already understood racial tensions to be structural of the American
fabric; there are too many to list here and they reach back centuries, but Philip Guston in his
lifetime, was one of them.
The earliest and most noted version of the response against the decision was the open letter
signed by “over 2,600 by artists, curators, writers, and critics”2 first published in The Brooklyn Rail

Collective, “Open Letter: On Phillip Guston Now,” Brooklyn Rail, September 30, 2020,
https://brooklynrail.org/projects/on-philip-guston-now/.
2
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on September 30, 2020, shortly after the postponement announcement. It condemned the
institutions’ “longstanding failure to have educated, integrated, and prepared themselves to meet
the challenge of the renewed pressure for racial justice that has developed over the past five
years.”3 But as the lack of resolution to the situation stretched out, more and more writers began to
weigh in.
In its print version of October 19, 2020, The New Yorker published an essay by Peter
Schjeldahl originally titled “Us Cosmopolitans” discussing the issue in their “Critics” section.
However, the magazine interestingly renamed it online to “Philip Guston and the Boundaries of
Art Culture.”4 While the renaming of articles online after they are printed is not unusual for the
magazine, the change in question speaks to the center of the article, and of the issue. Schjeldahl
makes an enormous effort of self-reflection, becoming one of the few writers on the discussion
who refused a position for or against the decision. However, though he is a seasoned and selfpondering art critic who is not alien to open-ended questions, the flexing of the muscles in the
essay seems particularly sore. An admirer of Guston, Schjeldahl sincerely opens his imagination to
those on the other side of his taste. In fact, it seems that he is less interested in the actual judgement
of taste, either his or the audience’s, than in the debate that anticipates it. He seems to wonder
whether it is possible that any aesthetic judgment be issued universally, i.e., to an unspecified
other. In his apologetic retreat, he seems forced, in other words, to question whether art can be
made and judged at all, outside of a specifically defined community.
But why is the matter of the title important? By the end of the essay, Schjeldahl would all
but eliminate the reality of an us, and in the title change, the editors presumably shy away from

3

Ibid.
Peter Schjeldahl, “Philip Guston and the Boundaries of Art Culture,” The New Yorker, October 19, 2020,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/10/19/philip-guston-and-the-boundaries-of-art-culture.
4

6

even the possibility of an us, lest it be cause for more discontent; how dare anyone include anyone
else in a group of peers? In his reflection, Schjeldahl unwittingly and begrudgingly corners himself
into refuting the main tenet of the Kantian judgement of taste, which I will explain in the next
chapter, but which in short, states that such a judgement is by its very nature issued universally.
Thus, Schjeldahl finds himself in a difficult position: “I’m ambushed by imagining the intractable
opposition of people who neither find humor nor seek subtlety in racist symbology,”5 he says. He
is cornered by conjuring up a group of people who make even the possibility of agreement
untenable. What is under discussion is not whether there is or should be difference of taste, but
something prior to that: whether it is possible for someone like Schjeldahl, who makes a sincere
effort to check his judgement against the judgement of others, to not find himself stuck in this dead
end. “Offense doesn’t spur debate; it replaces it,”6 he says justly. Up until this point, we can still
interpret debate as quarreling, in the sense that Kant intended: two parties who though not initially
in agreement nevertheless have the hope of arriving in agreement. Here, Schjeldahl seems to
conclude that what makes the quarreling impossible is the potential offense to the interlocutors (the
audience) that a work like Guston’s might contain.
This is where he begins to introduce imprecise and conflicting definitions of the audience
in question. In order to exit his self-created ambush Schjeldahl tries, ill-fatedly and in a slow selfflagellation, to name at least one audience group whom he imagines shares some common basis of
intellectual agreement. He names “cosmopolitans,” “art people,” “liberals,” “atomized liberals,”
“intellectuals,” and eventually identifies these as his “cohort.” Next, he places his cohort in direct
contrast to “folks at large,” and even more strangely to “all constituencies.” In this final contrast
Schjeldahl virtually opposes these liberals –implicitly characterized as the group of large city

5
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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dwellers, mostly residing in the American coastal cities, who share what Americans call liberal
cultural values – and everyone. Naturally, if what is typically understood as the foreground and
forefront of an entire culture -– the implicit best and most outstanding of what that culture has to
offer – is at absolute odds with its own totality, this must lead to a somber outcome; and so it does.
As a result, Schjeldahl is no less than forced to conclude his article with the following ominous
reflection:
Art goes on. Art that is transgressive will recur. But it will do so nakedly for anyone who
Chooses to characterize it, not only for those initiates who congratulate one another on their
shared investment in standards of truth, beauty, and good conscience. Cold winds are
blowing from the future onto aspirations to provide society, or even segments of society,
with a capacity to bridge differences with mutual respect. I’ve often reflected that uses of
“we” in critical writing are unavoidably presumptuous, though they are meant only to invite,
Or perhaps to seduce, agreement. I’ve never felt less confidence in the pronoun, at a time of
alienations that recall what W.B. Yeats perceived in another pandemic year, 1919: ‘Mere
anarchy is loosed upon the world.’”7
The pronoun “we” haunts Schjeldahl and his cohort because he missed the point of his own
pondering, which is that what makes debate impossible is not offense, but the loss of the possibility
of we: The idea that Kant calls sensus communis.
This central question of we, is not the only reason I wrote about the Guston controversy
and Schjeldahl’s article. The latter writes, “in a small way, the controversy exemplifies divisions
that are splintering the United States: votes of no confidence in the good will of contending
interests.”8 This is evident; but notably, The Tate Modern, a leading British museum, was right
alongside The [U.S.] National Gallery in the decision to postpone the show. This is a direct
example of how this cultural division is not only an American phenomenon. Race, not the only one
but a central theme of the division, operates differently from the U.S. in Great Britain as well as in
the rest of the world, and the socio-economic scenario that I described earlier is fairly specific to
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the United States. Nevertheless, the general aspects of the division are evidently being seen across
the globe, and in particular in the West.
The Philosopher Hannah Arendt argues that Kant’s focus towards the end of his life was on
man’s sociability, “the fact that no man can live alone, that men are interdependent not merely in
their needs and cares but in their highest faculty, the human mind, which will not function outside
human society.”9 In face of the profound rifts that American society – and the western world in
general – is currently experiencing, even facts that seemed indisputable, are put into question, and
the common basis of almost any agreement slowly slips away. In Arendt’s notes, the statement
about human beings’ inherent social character is immediately followed by an extensive passage of
Kant’s third critique called “Carazan’s Dream,” from 1764. In that passage, Carazan, the
protagonist, has a dream in which he realizes the utter horror that humans face if they become
isolated from their fellow humans. In waking from his nightmare, Carazan concludes, “now I have
been taught to esteem mankind; for in that terrifying solitude I would have preferred even the least
of those whom in the pride of my fortune I had turned from my door to all the treasures of
Golconda.”10 This is the reason for the ominous epigraph that precedes my introduction. Neither
Kant’s story nor the film I recited speak of isolated communities, of the ghettoization of identity,
as theorist of aesthetics Thierry de Duve puts it, but of the extinction of community altogether.
What Schjeldahl’s article unintentionally points to is that the latter may very well be a
development of the former. I see the Dark and the Wicked, therefore, as a contemporary nightmare
perfectly analogous to Kant’s and I believe it is no coincidence that the film arrives now.
The main theoretical argument of this thesis is that without a basis of sensus communis
under which to quarrel, those who have any hope for eventual agreement will persistently find

9

Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 10.
Arendt, Kant’s Political Philosophy, 12.
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themselves in the same perpetual, self-retracting, and mutually-degrading (to steal Arendt’s term11)
position that Schjeldahl found himself in his essay. To the end of defending this argument, I look
at the work of another artist, the well-established and highly celebrated British filmmaker and artist
at large Steve McQueen. The Tate Modern, the other museum in the Guston debacle, has close ties
with the artist; it held a major retrospective of his work just last year, in 2020. The artist, who has
resided in Amsterdam with his family for the past several years, is Black and also a London native;
he comes from an immigrant West-Indian community in the city, one that like other minority
communities suffered – and suffers – significant violence and injustice, as shown in his film series
Small Axe. In this context, McQueen’s oeuvre, almost always in English, is highly visible to
northern and western audiences, engaging with the main issues of the current ethos, but with a
unique and decidedly non-American-centric perspective. His deserved celebration is partially a
recognition of an example of a contemporary body of art that foregrounds matters of identity
without compromising itself to the procedure that can accompany ideological art.
With regard to the term ideological art, which I believe flirts with the oxymoronic, and to
avoid eliminating nuance, I quote de Duve’s statement: “I don’t dispute the ideological nature of
aesthetic decisions, inasmuch as ideology is the realm of the unthought, the unargued, or the
involuntary. Only when they aim to convince reticent others and leave them room for free response
do ideological statements approach the status of aesthetic judgements.”12 In other words, pure
ideology, as in a hermetic and immutable system of beliefs, is not art. At the same time, aesthetic
decisions, which lead to works of art, do contain systems of beliefs. De Duve simply claims that art
is not reducible to a system of beliefs and that it is in its openness to its undefined interlocutor as
well as in its intrinsic need to achieve agreement from the interlocutor of its own status of beautiful

11
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Ibid, 12.
Thierry de Duve, Aesthetics at Large: Art, Ethics, Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), 75.
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– or of art – that it fulfills its aesthetic “form of purposiveness.”13 Because of this, aesthetic
judgements are social in a way that no other judgement is; that is why they involve the sensus
communis. In what way are they social, whether only mentally, or in practice as well, depends on
the interpretation of Kant’s theory.
In order to help me reflect on Steve McQueen’s works, I used four main texts: The first is
Kant’s original Critique of Aesthetic Judgments,14 the other three, by Hannah Arendt,15 JeanFrançois Lyotard,16 and Thierry de Duve17 respectively, all interpret Kant’s Third Critique and his
idea of sensus communis. Each text is separated by about twenty years, as are the ages of each
author. Arendt’s interpretation, the first one, is the most practical, as she is openly concerned with
politics. Lyotard’s is the most theoretical, and de Duve considers both aesthetics and politics in his
reading, falling somewhere between the two previous texts. My objective is to use each text as a
springboard to consider Steve McQueen’s work as well as to give the reader an understanding of
how the artist is received and what kinds of impact his work has had, underling, hopefully, that the
idea of community, the possibility of shared commonality, is essential to a thriving culture, and
that that idea must be fought for, especially in moments like this.

13

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement trans. Werner S. Pluhar. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), §
11.
14
Ibid.
15
Arendt, Kant’s Political Philosophy.
16
Lyotard, trans. Marian Hobson and Geoff Benning. “Sensus Communis,” Paragraph, Vol.11, no. 1 (March 1988).
17
De Duve, Aesthetics at Large.
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Chapter 1: Community and Feeling
Colloquially, the term common sense is meant to suggest something that is obvious or
plain, but tracing back its etymology evokes less immediate associations. The Latin term, sensus
communis, sometimes translated as common sense, suggests the association of sensus with
feeling and communis with community. Together, they can be interpreted as a feeling of all. Or
in more words, a feeling shared by all within a community. In the term’s more frequent,
colloquial use, the word common leaves implicit its association with community, and as this
audience is left undefined, the term suggests that the sense (be it a feeling or something other),
can apply to anyone and everyone.
These two ideas, of community and of feeling, comprise the spectrum of the sensus
communis that Kant, the philosopher responsible for this application of the term, and the three
authors discussed here, elaborate on. For Immanuel Kant, author of the Critique of Judgment, the
first part of which is the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment also known as the Kant’s Third Critique,
the sensus communis provided a name for an essential part of the unique mental procedure that
results in an aesthetic judgment.18 In his reasoning, he claimed that beautiful things are different
from likeable things and that the former presupposes the presence of the sensus communis while
the latter does not. This captivated the minds of thinkers who sought explanations for both
collective and political action, as well as the procedures of thought, and of course, for how we
define and interpret art, the term to be associated the longest with the beautiful.
To understand what Kant means by sensus communis, it is important to know that the
aesthetic judgement is the judgement that determines what is beautiful and it is one of three ways
in which humans like something. This distinction is crucial: We, human beings on earth, can like

18

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement trans. Werner S. Pluhar. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), §
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something as good, agreeable, or beautiful. Of the three, good, is the one we like based on a
concept. For Kant this means that it has an identifiable purpose against which the judgment is
made and that supports our liking of it i.e., we will judge the object depending on how it fulfills
its purpose. For this reason, the judgement of the good is universalizable and verifiable. In
addition to that, the good, when it is the moral good, is also the judgment that constitutes not
only “what we esteem,” but what we have “the utmost interest in.”19The good is thus, the matter
of moral judgments.
The agreeable, is what we like without a concept but with interest; it regards the things
that please us. Because it does not have a concept or therefore an identifiable purpose, it is
entirely subjective, and is based on every person’s individual pleasure of the senses and
experience, it is not universal and cannot be quarreled over or disputed. Kant says: “One person
loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of string instruments. It would be foolish if we
disputed about such differences with the intention of censuring another's judgment as incorrect if
it differs from ours, as if the two were opposed logically. Hence about the agreeable the
following principle holds: Everyone has his own taste (of sense).”20
Lastly, there is the object of the aesthetic judgment: The beautiful. The beautiful is
another thing entirely from the agreeable, in fact it is the opposite;21 someone cannot call
something beautiful “if they mean it is only beautiful to [them].”22 Beautiful, therefore, is what
we like without a concept and without interest, because if your senses receive pleasure from
something, you obviously have an interest in it. To repeat then, the beautiful is not what gives us

19

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement trans. Werner S. Pluhar. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), §
5.
20
Ibid, § 7.
21
Ibid. “Exactly the other way round,” Kant says.
22
Ibid.
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pleasure as a result of agreeing with our senses. Instead, it is the place where we locate the
property of beautiful, which as a property must be understood universally: It is as if it belonged
to the object. It is as if someone were to simply notice that an object had the property of beauty;
this property would not reside in the person who observed it but in the object itself. It is useful to
think of it as a special type of judgement, one that cannot be proven or disproven and that,
though it is subjective, it simultaneously requires universal assent. “If he proclaims something to
be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from others; he then judges not just for himself but
for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things.”23
Because it is not based on a concept, the beautiful must be judged on an individual basis,
object by object, as only concepts can give us rules for how to judge the individual against the
general. Even though it operates as if it were a property of the object, that property must be
identified each and every time a beautiful object is judged; the beautiful is not a property of all
roses but only of each rose, when and if such a judgement is made. Thus, “beauty is an object’s
form of purposiveness insofar as it is perceived in the object without the presentation of a
purpose.”24 In other words, the purpose, which defines the concept of a thing, is not present in
the beautiful object, but once it is judged as beautiful, then its beauty becomes its “form of
purposiveness.”25 If you think of purpose as an end, then the beautiful is its own end.
It is for these reasons, according to Kant, that when humans judge something to be
beautiful, they implicitly express it as if it were universal, and for the same reasons, why humans
argue (quarrel) about it in a way that we do not argue about each other’s personal preferences.26

23

Kant, Critique of Judgement, § 7.
Ibid, § 18.
25
Ibid, § 11.
26
Of course, a note may be made that we do in fact argue about these things that are simple personal preferences.
However, that most likely would be because as complex and confused beings we conflate categories of things all the
time, whether consciously or unconsciously. If we were able to see the difference of categories all the time, it would
24
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Kant wittily says in his critique of judgement: “It would be ridiculous if someone who
prided himself on his taste tried to justify it by saying: This object […] is beautiful for me. For he
must not call it beautiful if he means only that he likes it. Many things may be charming and
agreeable to him; no one cares about that.”27
There are many ways to explain the idea, derived from this reasoning, that is at the heart
of the interpretations below, so I will begin with a brief one here. The universal validity of moral
or theoretical statements may be expressed in the colloquial term common sense (common
understanding). For Kant, the colloquial common sense judges by dint of concepts. However, as
we have seen, the beautiful is also expressed with universal validity even though its objects
cannot be subsumed under a concept. Therefore, the way it is judged is through feeling. Either
the judgement/feeling or the idea of the judgment/feeling is what Kant calls sensus communis.28
The first of three interpretations discussed here, comes from the notes of Hanna Arendt’s
lecture class, taught in the late 1970’s at the New School in New York, shortly before her sudden
death. It is not a text that was published by her but rather posthumously, and from which she
likely read in her class. The class itself was about what she called Kant’s political philosophy.
According to Arendt, her fellow German philosopher had not lived to complete a body of work
that openly concerned itself with the political, and thus never wrote an official political
philosophy. However, she argues that he had begun to draw a line of political thinking from the
early days of his philosophical ambitions and had reanimated it after a “necessary detour,” which
indeed occupied most of his life, and where he “elaborated the human mind’s cognitive faculties
and their limitations” in an effort “that kept back and obstructed ‘like a dam’ all other matters he

be ridiculous, as Kant says, to argue about some of them. Also evidently, the ideas of conscious and unconscious as
we understand them today are posterior to Kant’s time.
27
Kant, Critique of Judgement, § 7.
28
Ibid, §24.
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had hoped to finish and publish.”29 Nevertheless, for Arendt, this political philosophy is largely
delineated in his Third Critique, and specifically in the first part, the “Critique of Aesthetic
Judgement.”
The New School Professor explains in those notes that Kant’s philosophy concerns itself
with different beings depending on what topic it is discussing. The beings of his reflections vary
between rational beings in general, humans as a species, and human beings on earth.30 The Third
Critique is concerned with the human being as a social being on earth, and so its space is the
public space. Since Arendt understands that politics is the realm of man’s public actions then it is
easy to see where her association of the aesthetic judgement with Kant’s political theory comes
from. She argues that the political realm is not open to all human interactions but rather that it is
precisely defined and limited to certain social and shared spaces that only concern man as a
social and public being. In turn, only these beings are supposedly gifted with sensus communis.
Arendt’s interest in this topic dated at least a decade back to 1967, when she wrote an
essay for The New Yorker titled “Truth and Politics.” The essay elaborates on the antithesis of
truth and politics, a subject that according to her is commonplace, given that truth has never been
a hallmark of the political realm. She distinguishes between different kinds of truth, namely
rational truth (which would encompass philosophical truths as well), such as the law of gravity,
and factual truth, such as the fact that the United States detonated two atomic bombs in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, at the end of World War II. Factual truths are
interestingly more fragile and more relevant to politics than rational ones, since once a factual
truth is lost it can never be recovered, while it is possible to discover the same rational truth more
than once. In that explanation she also already outlines different groups of beings and the

29
30

Hannah Arendt, Lessons on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 10.
Arendt, Kant’s Political Philosophy, 16.

16

consequences of that distinction. She writes, “since philosophical truth concerns man in his
singularity, it is unpolitical by nature,”31 making clear her view that the political realm is
constituted by men in the plural and their nature as social beings. She also asserts the difference
between philosophical truth and other kinds, such as factual or rational truth. She expands in her
lecture notes saying, “these [matters of taste] are not matters of cognition, truth compels, one
doesn’t need any ‘maxims.’ Maxims apply and are needed only for matters of opinion and in
judgements.”32 This further enriches her association between politics and beauty, in that neither
are based on conceptual judgments, one might say rational judgments, but on judgments of
feeling.
She further argues that not only are truth and politics antithetical, but also that they are
detrimental to each other, that the political realm should never operate according to truths
because it is not in its nature to attempt to base power on truth.33 In democracy, for example, the
power of the people functions according to the opinion of the majority, “for opinion, and not
truth, belongs among the indispensable prerequisites of all power.”34 Truth, which may or may
not be in accordance with the majority’s opinion (in the case of democracy) would fail to result
in a legitimate power, and would put the unquestionable status of factual or even rational truths
at risk.35 As a consequence, out of the three authors who interpret Kant, Arendt, Lyotard, and de
Duve, Arendt focuses most on the practical implication of the sensus communis, even opposing it
to sensus privatus, the private sense. However, despite the seemingly large differences between
Arendt’s and Lyotard’s readings in particular, several crucial passages point to a difference that
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is merely in the vocabulary, while there is an intimate agreement of most essential parts. In this
sense, the muddling of the universal aesthetic voice, with the “anthropologized”36 (as Lyotard
would call it) political voice of the majority is strongly discouraged by both Lyotard and Arendt.
Arendt writes:
To the philosopher - or, rather, to man insofar as he is a thinking being – this ethical
proposition about doing and suffering wrong is no less compelling than mathematical truth.
But to man insofar as he is a citizen, an acting being concerned with the world and the
public welfare rather than with his own well being - including, for instance, his ‘immortal
soul’ whose ‘health’ should have precedence over the needs of a perishable body - the
Socratic statement is not true at all. The disastrous consequences for any community that
began in all earnest to follow ethical precepts derived from man in the singular - be they
Socratic or Platonic or Christian - have been frequently pointed out.37
The gist of the practical implication she lays out is present in both the 1967 article and in
the conclusion to her class notes; it lies in the individual nature of the aesthetic judgment. In the
article, she argues that an example is a more powerful motivator of action than a set of rules.
There is no rule for collective, much less universal agreement; every political success may only
have precedent in individual examples, never in concepts. Together, these two qualities
demystify the popular idea of universal voice, sometimes compared to the “master narratives.”
The critique of those ideas generally stems from the argument that they have a totalizing effect
that eliminates voices of minority and dissent. The idea of history as example for future politics
is then, akin to the way that only in the singular experience of a work of art can we ever make an
aesthetic judgement and “utilize” our supposed faculty of sensus communis.
Showcasing her own brand of political awareness, Arendt, the German and Jewish
thinker of provocative originality – originality and bravery that bought her many enemies even
from within her own field – gives the example of a Thomas Jefferson phrase to illustrate her
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argument. She quotes him saying that “a lively and lasting sense of filial duty is more effectually
impressed on the mind of a son or daughter by reading ‘King Lear’ than by all the dry volumes
of ethics and divinity that ever were written.”38 Though both her essays concern politics, it is
again a telling example that King Lear is a work of art of political overtones but is not a
historical event. As Lyotard would say, sensus communis, is at the crossroad of art, literature,
and philosophy. This perspective seems to be true even for Arendt.
Thus, Arendt’s main transition from theoretical to practical is in the conclusion of both
texts – the article and her class notes – where she makes one exception for the positive
intersection of philosophical truth and politics. “Philosophical truth can become “practical” and
inspire action without violating the rules of the political realm only when it manages to become
manifest in the guise of an example.”39 Her position is compatible with de Duve’s on this
important instance, that sensus communis is a capacity that humans may possess, but which does
not always rule their behavior in every instance in which it should. In her philosophical/political
analyses then, she does not only demonstrate what is, but also what should be. For that reason, it
is most notable that it is not in Kant’s critique of practical reason nor in his critique of moral
judgment that she finds support for her argument, but in the critique of aesthetic judgment, in the
beautiful.
Lyotard’s main divergence from Arendt is in his argument that “this sensus isn't a sense,
and the feeling which is supposed to affect it (as a sense can be affected) isn't common, but only
in principle communicable. There is no assignable community of feeling, no affective consensus
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in fact. And if we claim to have recourse to one, or a fortiori to create one, we are victims of a
transcendental illusion and we are encouraging impostures.”40
With the caveat that Arendt foresees political implications for this mental capacity, she
does not suggest the actual possibility of universal agreement on any subject. But Lyotard speaks
of the sensus communis being related to the unintelligent [this is Lyotard’s term and can also be
understood as the pre-cognitive] and the untouchable and further, that the “sensus isn't indeed
situated in that space and time which the concept uses to know objects, in the space-time of
knowledge.”41 Thus, he allows us to ask how the terms universal and unknowable can be
reconciled. It seems that for something to be universal it must be demonstrable and
communicable, therefore unquestionable, and universally valid. These things exist in science, as
they exist in Kant’s philosophy, but the aesthetic judgement is none of them. Yet aesthetic
judgments claim universal assent because they are issued as if beauty were a property of the
object. Lyotard says that the aesthetic judgment cannot be questioned, it is unprovable, not a
product of determinate thought but of reflexive thought.42 yet it is unquestionable.
Lyotard’s dense but poetic interpretation sheds light on an anti-positivist aspect of the
human mind, and because of this it is as against a practical application of the sensus communis as
it is. “On the occasion of a form, which itself is only an occasion for feeling,” he says, the
animation of the mind “is not moving towards anything.”43 In this process [of the aesthetic
judgment and of the “feeling of the beautiful”], it is “as if the mind were discovering that it can
do something other than will and understand.”44
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According to Lyotard, the region of the mind where the feeling of the beautiful takes
place is one of
Resistance of institutions and establishment, where is inscribed and hidden what happens
‘before’ we know what it is and before we want to make it into anything at all. This pleasure
[the pleasure that signals the beautiful] is an inscription without support, and without a
code by which it can be read off. Miserable, if you like. It is the task of literatures and arts,
the task of what is called writing, to reinscribe it according to its miserable state, without
filling it full, and without getting rid of it.45
His reading is thus one that connects the mental process of experiencing the beautiful
with the task of art in our society, and though Lyotard calls this process a miserable process, his
is the most affective, and tender of the three readings. Whereas de Duve’s reading comes with a
warning, and Arendt’s comes with predictions, Lyotard’s is open ended, and for this reason it is
closer to, not the definition, but to the experience of art.
De Duve’s reading, both theoretical and political, explains that “the standard reading of
the Third Critique sees the theoretical necessity of this supposition [that humans possess the
sensus communis faculty] clearly,” but believes that it “pays insufficient attention to the quasimoral obligation” implied in this idea. 46 Therefore, he proposes a reading that “underlines
Kant’s skepticism as to whether sensus communis is a natural endowment of the human species –
say, an instinct – or whether it is merely an idea, but one we cannot live without.”47
In Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgement “the objective necessity that everyone's feeling
flow along with the particular feeling of each person, would signify only that there is a
possibility of reaching such agreement.”48 This possibility is the essential part to any discussion
about art that Peter Schjeldahl missed in his article. What de Duve stresses is that while “the
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judgment of taste would only offer an example of the application of this principle,” it is today,
effectively the main and essential space – the space where we discuss art – in which humans
exercise this so important quality. De Duve writes that for Kant it is “the place where hope in the
ethical destiny of humanity was put to test;”49 with one important adaptation already hinted at
above.
The fact that the beautiful is not based on a concept is what led Kant to identify the object
of the aesthetic judgement as being mostly the domain of nature; a sunset does not have a
purpose, it simply is. As such, “pure judgements of taste,” as Kant would stipulate, were not the
realm of man-made objects, because painting conventions, for example, could be interpreted as
verifiable concepts.50 De Duve’s essential update to Kant’s theory on this point is that with the
introduction of the readymade in the early twentieth century, the replacement of the term
“beautiful” for the term “art” was necessary, with every other aspect of Kant’s critique remaining
intact. This answers the question that may arise for the reader as to whether, for example,
Duchamp’s Fountain, or really any number of modern and contemporary works, are beautiful.
While this is not the ultimate test, one will not find many art theorists and critics debating the
beauty of these works; the debate became instead, whether it was art. This does not mean that the
quality of art is no longer debated, it still is very much the subject of art criticism, or else that
field would have been extinguished. Criticism like the one in the Schjeldahl’s article, however,
that miss the “whether it is art” part of the discussion is unable, as a result, to proceed to the
discussion of quality.
From within the field of aesthetic, a notable critique as to the existence of this elusive
faculty was written by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, who argued against Kant’s claim
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that the faculty of sensus communis could not be proven or disproven saying that history has in
fact proven such a faculty to be inexistent and impossible after the perpetration of the Holocaust.
The idea can be surmised in Adorno’s famous saying that “there is no poetry after Auschwitz.”
De Duve’s rebuttal is that on one hand this critique relies on the confusion of the historical fact
that the holocaust happened, and what that fact represents rationally. He claims that Adorno and
Horkheimer conflate the two, deducing from a historical fact a rational one, a conflation that
Kant was categorically against. If we could prove that sensus communis did not exist, we would
have a Sadist world where no one would ever act outside of their own individual interest. On the
other hand, the theorist defends that Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique further corrupts Kant’s
philosophy by essentially eliminating from it any sentiment, so that in that philosophy the human
world would be ruled by rational consequences alone without any interference from, for
example, the feeling of empathy. What positively comes out from de Duve’s critique of Adorno
and Horkheimer,51 however, is the recognition that modernity has pushed the interpretation of
moral sentiment towards a duty – what de Duve calls “ought” in his book – rather than a definite
yes.
Historically, the second most significant observation about the sensus communis is that it
has never been proven to be a natural endowment of humans; even for Kant, it is left open as to
whether “taste is this faculty [of sensus communis] or whether it signals it”52 as de Duve puts it.
The first most important observation is that, not being a provable or disprovable faculty, it
continues to offer, as an idea, the possibility of a view of humanity as being able to progress
towards a more ethical existence.
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Finally, I must position the artist holding the regard of this thesis, Steve McQueen.
Because McQueen’s work openly engages issues of race (and some would say even if it didn’t), I
must state that since the first encounter of Europeans with other non-European and thus nonwhite populations, there has been subjugation, violence, oppression, and exploitation by
Europeans (and their descendants at large) against those populations on the basis of their nonwhiteness. That seemingly was the more straightforward path to justify the unjustifiable
dehumanizing actions perpetrated by the colonial power and beyond. In this light, all art since
that encounter and the consequent systematic exploitation of the colonizers over the colonized, is
either implicitly or explicitly, racially and politically positioned. Furthermore, because this
exploitation shaped the global socio-economic landscape in which we live, it is a contemporary
issue. It would still be contemporary issue even if we, as a society, were much more advanced in
terms of eliminating race as a basis for exploitation and violence than we are. Like most of his
contemporaries, McQueen is a multimedia artist. Like many if not most of his contemporaries he
has consistently pushed back against belonging to a delineated community, not only of identity
but of theory as well. In response to the seemingly exhausting number of times critics have tried
to tether his art to a theory or a group he has stated: “My art is not an illustration for theory: my
art is an answer to things that I’ve been trying to grasp at that can only be answered within the
work. That’s it. Just like the sculptor, you have to create the environment where you have the
tools and materials to want to sort of play, to get to that point when you have created the answer
within the object.”53
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McQueen’s speech is protective of his work, and like a maker, he speaks of arriving at
answers. There is always a permeable aspect to art, however, especially when it is not
ideological, when it is an end in itself. It is permeable in the sense that Lyotard means
“unintelligent,” it ebbs and flows, it opens the mind rather than closes it, it is not subject to
concepts and the imagination prevails over the other faculties. This is also true for Arendt, who
says that “in the Critique of Pure Reason imagination is at the service of the intellect; in the
Critique of Judgment the intellect is ‘at the service of imagination.’”54
Despite differences of interpretation, Kant’s critique and all three texts by Arendt,
Lyotard, and de Duve, firmly agree that the aesthetic judgement cannot be subsumed under a rule
or a concept; it is made each and every time before each and every object regarded. This suggests
that in exercising the “community of faculties in the feeling of the beautiful”55 we ask a new
question every time we encounter an artwork, be it the first time or the hundredth. As a
consequence, the business of art is a business of asking questions, not answering them. This task
is not so easy as it seems, as any casual observation of history indicates that humans are more
comfortable with answers, either concocted or given, than we are with questions. In this light one
could say that questions are ends that belong to art, while answers are ends that belong to
questions that can be answered.

54
55

Arendt, Kant’s Political Philosophy, 84.
Lyotard, Sensus Communis, 21.

25

Chapter 2: A Formalist or Something Else
On the occasion of a major retrospective at The Tate Modern in the spring of 2020, titled
simply Steve McQueen, the museum organized a catalogue for which the artist was interviewed.
In the conversation, led by Hamza Walker, an American curator and collaborator of McQueen on
several projects, the artist outlined two aspects under which to consider his work56. The first, his
refusal to associate his practice with any single aesthetic movement or approach, the second,
following from the first, that the content always dictates the form that his work takes. While this
certainly explains the variety of formats and even mediums the artist has practiced in, it points to
the most significant aspect of McQueen’s career, his unique ability and commitment to use form
as a translation of content, which for him often turns out to be concerns of a moral or ethical
nature.
The artist dedicated his gaze to his own community in his latest film project, Small Axe
(2020), a group of five narrative features all centered around the West-Indian community in
London where McQueen grew up and of which he is a part. However, a brief glance backwards
indicates where his interest in a broad spectrum of issues has taken him. In his first feature film,
Hunger (96 min, 2008), he tells the story of the historical character Bobby Sands, the first of ten
men in the Northern Ireland of the 1970’s who died in prison as the result of a hunger strike that
sought the recognition of Irish republican activists, as political prisoners. In Shame (101 min,
2011), his main character, played by the same actor as in Hunger, the British-German Michael
Fassbender and three-time collaborator of McQueen, is a wealthy contemporary New Yorker
with sex addiction and a difficulty of emotional attachment. In 12 Years a Slave (134 min, 2013)
another film based on a true story, a free Black man in the Antebellum United States is abducted
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from the north and sold into slavery in the south, where he remains for twelve years as a slave
until regaining freedom. In his non-narrative works, McQueen documented the artistic practice
of Trip-Hop pioneer Tricky in Girls, Tricky (14 min 47 secs, 2001), reflected on the relationship
between the British Crown and the Iraq War in Queen and Country (mixed media, 2007) and restaged the practice of taking class pictures of school children in London in Year 3 (photography,
2020). What is at the center of these themes, if they are not unified by a single identity, social
issue, time, or place, nor by a single medium or aesthetic approach?
Though McQueen is a multimedia artist, and has, as I said, produced important objects
and installations that are not properly described as photography or film, he is a lens-based artist
first and foremost. This means that his work is most often than not guided by the scope of his
lens and that through it, he developed a mode of working that Walker calls the “act of looking;”57
the idea that placing your gaze on something is a way to say, “this matters.” At the same time,
the diversity of time, place, and context of the struggles McQueen chooses to foreground,
contrasts against the few elements that are consistent. After filming Grenfell Tower in 2017,
documenting the ruins of the housing project in London that caught fire and killed 72 people that
same year, he told Walker, “People are dying because they are marginalized, that is what
Grenfell is for me.”58 Walker then asked him, “you referred to it as a kind of staple, as a place
and a location, when you think about different cultures as well as West Indian life. Is what it
represents to you personal on that level?” McQueen’s answer, both affective and precise, links
the moral and the aesthetic aspects of
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his practice to the idea of sensus communis presented in chapter one. He says, “It is personal to
me but it should be personal to everyone.”59
As discussed in the previous chapters, the word everyone has broadly become
controversial. Naturally, it carries with it an assumption that it is possible for all humans, in a
community if not in the world, to share an understanding, feeling, or experience of anything.
This is, oddly to some, an increasingly polarizing idea. In McQueen’s response, the word should,
suggests a moral position, where this idea is treated as a moral imperative. However, it is the
word personal that has the most interesting role in the sentence; In affirming “yes, it is personal
to me” but “it should be personal to everyone” he subverts the typical use of the word, which is
to express an individualistic sentiment, and extends the individual’s experience into a collective
responsibility. This chapter argues that McQueen’s phrase is not only descriptive of his
approach, but also that it is the main constant in the otherwise heterogenous array of his
explorations. In order to show this, however, the two aspects - form and content - need to be
sorted out, for McQueen’s treatment of his subjects is a result of evading being pigeonholed in
either formalism or identity politics, two terms that by no means encompass the vastness of art,
criticism, or art history of their time, but that do, however, encompass the vast majority of the
terms used to describe Steve McQueen’s work.
In January of 1999 the artist had just turned thirty when he saw the opening of a
retrospective of his work at the Institute of Contemporary Art in London, a feat in itself, which
even at a medium or small sized institution many artists do not experience until well into their
careers and sometimes only in old age, if ever. As writer Solveig Nelson recently pointed out, at
the time of that retrospective “his work was being described as formalist and not about identity,
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[with the] notable exception [of] an essay by Okwui Enwezor that elegantly stressed the
interweaving of both.”60 In her essay, Nelson points out the close relationship between gay
identity, with which McQueen does not identify, and his cinema. More than twenty years since
that early exhibition, the term formalism continues to be as central in the extensive literature
about McQueen as it had been at the time, even if the other term, “identity,” has increased in
mentions as well.
“Every commentator of Steve McQueen starts out from a basic observation of fact about
his work, which is that it can be seen to have been from the outset a reflection on the medium,
beginning with the cinema,”61 Georges Didi-Huberman remarks, in a quasi-paraphrase
description of “medium-specificity,” a central tenet of formalism. While from Nelson’s
perspective the association with formalism comes from authors who link “discourses of
structuralist film, painting, and early cinema,” and track “McQueen’s expansive and
encyclopedic range of references and sources,”62 nearly every article about McQueen either
mentions the term formalism directly or a sub-current of it as an observable aspect of his work.
The artist also moves between modes of engagement without clear affiliations, operating at one
moment in a seemingly structuralist film mode, as in Charlotte (5 min 42 sec, 2004), and at
another in the mode of cinéma vérité, as in Exodus (1 min 5 sec, 1992/97). Jean Fischer, who has
a number of prominent publications on McQueen, observed in 2002 that “as several writers have
remarked, McQueen judiciously distils many of the moves of earlier avant-garde and
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independent film languages,”63 referring to movements that would have necessarily constituted
the history of modernism, the historical period with which formalism is sometimes interchanged.
At the same time terms of identity and politics, which in turn are also not interchangeable
but oftentimes are used as if they were, are almost as equally prominent in the literature about the
artist, and Nelson’s own article, from 2020, observes that the combination that has most stood for
McQueen’s success over the decades is his concern with form as much as with political subject
matter. However, just as “formalism” and “modernism” are neither interchangeable nor
synonymous, these terms often appear muddled and confused while “identity” and “formalism”
frequently appear as an irreconcilable dichotomy, or at best, as terms at odds with each other,
with writers frequently defending McQueen’s place in either one field or the other. Nelson’s
article is a good example, in that the author introduces the two terms as immiscible substances
and even after a brief mention of Enwezor’s “interweaving of both,” continues on to ascribe
McQueen a relationship to a solidly identity-oriented field of filmmaking. Oftentimes, these
analyses express complexity and nuance about one camp, as is the case of “Steve McQueen and
the New Queer Cinema,” and a simplistic reduction of the other. But even at their most nuanced,
“formalism” and “identity” do not bear a one-to-one relationship: One is an aesthetic approach,
the other pertains to subject matter, and to suggest a conflict between them creates a source of
friction that is itself more political than aesthetic. Enwezor himself later returned to an analysis
of McQueen’s early works, and formulated a new pair of terms, keeping only the term
“formalism” from the old one: “[…] Bear (1993), his first publicly exhibited film, and the
triumphant masterpiece Western Deep (2002) offer contrasts describing two important poles in
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his work: The former is formalist and carefully scripted while the latter is experimental and open
to chance.” 64 Notably here, Enwezor highlights formalism as a controlled and scripted practice,
and its opposition to experimentalism, as a practice open to chance and accident rather than
identity.
Despite the very awkwardness of Nelson’s phrase (“described as formalist and not about
identity”) belying a problem of comparison, this false conflict is repeated both in the literature
about McQueen’s work and in contemporary aesthetic discourse, on one hand by those who see
postmodernist expressions as solutions to modernist problems and on the other by those who see
McQueen’s successful practice as a sublimation of a verifiably rare kind: That of translating
moral and ethical concerns into their own visual language. In reality, this apparent conflict is one
manifestation of the broader tensions arising from the transition between the modern and the
postmodern period. As such, it is no more and no less than an expression of the divergent
interests of those involved in narrativizing that transition.
Two narratives, in turn, can be told of the relationship between formalism and
modernism. One story tells how the modernist avant-gardes deconstructed the structures of their
artistic mediums, to understand them better and innovate their use in what became known in
certain spaces as formalism. For those avant-gardes “language was not a neutral vehicle made to
transparently convey concepts directly from mind to mind, but had materiality of its own and that
this materiality was always charged with significations,”65 so that in order to communicate an
idea, the medium had to express and transform itself accordingly. Another story describes a more
static version of formalism, in which it appears as a somewhat fixed aesthetic, represented in art

Okwui Enwezor. “From Screen to Space: Projection and Reanimation in the Early Work of Steve McQueen,” in
Steve McQueen Works, ed. Isabel Friedli, (Schaulager Basel: Laurenz Foundation, 2012), 22.
65
Yves Alain Bois. “Formalism and Structuralism,” in Art Since 1900, ed. Foster, Hal, Rosalind Kraus, Yves-Alain
Bois, Benjamin H. Buchloh and David Joselit. (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2016), 32-39.
64

31

by abstract painters and sculptors such as Barnett Newman, Mark Rothko, David Smith and so
on, and in theory by critics like Clement Greenberg. In that story this aesthetic becomes the
immutable mask of modern art. In this version of formalism, it appears as a simple form-asshape, or morphology that “bypasses content”66 in favor of a vacant exploration of form, and at
worst delivers an almost prescribed look. The use of the term formalism typically falls
somewhere between the two ends of this spectrum. However, regardless of its place in that
spectrum the term appears as a companion to modernism in most art historical accounts.
“Historically,” de Duve writes, “modernism and formalism often went hand in hand, as was the
case in the writings of Greenberg.”67
In the case of postmodernism in art, it was not so simple; its main trait during its years of
formulation was its opposition to modernism, so rather than a comparable descriptor, it offered
up another characteristic instead. “Postmodernism, in part born from a radical critique of those
writings [Greenberg’s], has by now spawned a number of interpretations, one of them being its
association with multiculturalism and identity politics,” de Duve continues.68 While abstract art
by its very nature tends to be less openly political, the post-sixties’ engagement with identity
politics resulted in the latter becoming its chief marker. Soon thereafter a narrative congealed in
which formalism featured as modernism’s main descriptor, and identity politics as the main
descriptor of postmodernism, in which the two descriptors became an embattled synecdoche of
each narrative, even if persistently insufficient to describe or explain any number of artists that
fell under their names.
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Most of this narrative was formed during the late 70’s when modernism fell out of favor
giving way to these new tendencies. The decline of formalism, both as a delineated movement
and as a form of critique was accompanied by the unprecedented incorporation and embrace of
the language of advertisement and entertainment into art, a claim that warrants little evidence
beyond observing the enduring impact of Warhol’s Campbell Soup canvases or the imperious
return of the ready-made. Following the social upheaval of the late 1960’s, the 70’s and 80’s saw
developments in technology and the soaring influence of television and pop culture that made the
use of video, light and multi-media installations increasingly more accessible and popular. One
by one, new mediums and aesthetic approaches, such as the conceptualist approach, and the
mediums of videoart and performance, became institutionalized and fully embraced by the
exhibition complex. At the same time the once dominant commitment to medium specificity
became outdated, and hybrids, or multi-media works proliferated to the extent that single
medium artists today are the vast minority.
Though he is largely dedicated to the lens-based mediums, McQueen himself has made
significant works outside of them, the most notable being the installation Queen and Country
made between 2007-09, a specially designed wooden display system containing facsimile sheets
of postage stamps, also designed by the artist, of British soldiers deployed to the Iraq war
intended to be put into circulation; essentially a byproduct of photography, sculpture, conceptual
and mail art. Likewise, works like White Elephant from 1998, a sculpture/interactive installation,
Black and Blue from 2001, a two-dimensional conceptual-like work, Untitled (Wall), from
1998/99, a site-specific installation, are neither lens-based nor time-based.
All the while formalism was increasingly attacked: Bois argued that “the anti-formalism
that was prevalent in the discourse of art criticism in the seventies can be explained in great part
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by confusion between two kinds of formalism, one that concerns itself essentially with
morphology (which I call ‘restricted formalism’), and one that envisions form as structural.”69
Bois further argued that in order to retrieve formalism from “the wastebasket of discarded
ideas”70 it should be understood structural. It is not under the banner of formalism or
structuralism that McQueen’s oeuvre operates but simply under an understanding that form
produces meaning in itself.
In the twelve years that have passed since Bois’ essay, though, the term identity politics
has itself seen a meteoric rise in art and culture discourse, and consequently has also seen
restricted versions of itself played out, constituting the other banner which McQueen has been
tasked to dismantle and reframe. One could argue that soon that term will also need rescuing. But
at the risk of attaching emotional or nostalgic import to terms or movements, it suffices to say
that Steve McQueen’s insight comes from uniting socio-political concerns with the form best
suited to express them.
There is one final element that reveals McQueen’s unique position in this chronology,
which is his medium. Curiously, the lens-based mediums, which at the onset of the 1970’s were
still strictly divided into photography, film, and video (the latter treated as another animal
altogether) seems to offer a kind of exception to that trajectory. In contrary direction to painting
and sculpture, it was at the end of the 1960’s that both film and photography gained ground in
terms of avant-garde experimentation within an institutional framework. Both seminal
movements, structuralist film and the new art photography really began to coalesce at the end of
that decade. While the mediums had had their formalist proponents such as Aaron Siskind, often
dubbed the abstract expressionist photographer, and modernist artists such as Richard Serra,

69
70

Bois, “Formalism.”
Ibid.

34

experimented to great effect with film, they did not figure in the same way as painting and
sculpture in the Greenbergian-formalist narrative. The focus in that narrative was predominantly
on painting and sculpture, eclipsing significant formalist advances in film such as in the case of
the Russian filmmakers earlier that century, that were later revisited by some American
filmmakers in the 1960’s. The restricted formalism and the association with medium specificity
was typically observed in the work of painters and sculptors. Photography had mostly retained a
documentational character prone to represent sociopolitical issues or simply served private
commercial purposes.71 One could say, then, that there is a kind of delay that also affected the
reading of McQueen’s oeuvre: That is while formalism was waning elsewhere, its residual
influence was still impacting the relatively nascent lens-based field. Even within that scenario,
McQueen stood out in terms of the uniqueness of his approach. For example, Jean Fischer points
out that “in an emphatic rejection of recent artistic trends, McQueen's film works set about
exploring how, in pushing to the limit the material and affective possibilities of art and cinema,
both may be reclaimed as vehicles of experimentation in the service of the 'real'.72
Both observations above – that the interpretations about McQueen come with a delay
associated to his medium and that the chasm between modernism and postmodernism in art was
more appearance than reality – point toward the same analyses, synthesized by Frederic Jameson
in his seminal reading of postmodernism; that postmodernism’s cultural manifestations are
largely continuations of capitalist trends, rather than ruptures. They outline a continuous process
of culture becoming inseparable from economy, which evidently did not begin in the 1960’s or
70’s. There is a perceptible shift in that "modernism was still minimally and tendentially the
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critique of the commodity and the effort to make it transcend itself [while] postmodernism is the
consumption of sheer commodification as a process," which in a sense is at the crux of what may
have been lost or slipped between the two periods. However, Jameson asserts, “postmodernism is
not the cultural dominant of a wholly new social order (the rumor about which, under the name
of post ‘industrial-society,’ ran through the media a few years ago), but only the reflex and the
concomitant of yet another systemic modification of capitalism itself.” In this context,
McQueen’s work does in fact go against the grain of the art industry, one that “only clocks
variations themselves and knows contents are just more images,” and sketches itself as a
template of a practice that is developed according to art as aesthetic experience, not as ideology,
not as commodity, not as advertisement or propaganda, not as reification of capital, but namely
as something that contains its own end and is, as Kant would say, as its own “form of
purposiveness.”
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Chapter 3. Forms of Engagement
Through the lens of the Kantian theory of aesthetic judgment, Hannah Arendt, JeanFrançois Lyotard, and Thierry de Duve, each about two decades apart, expanded on the idea of
sensus communis to reassert the implications of a human mind reliant on its relationship with
other humans. In his art practice, Steve McQueen united formal innovation with ethical and
political concerns in such a way that he also stressed the social and mutually reliant aspects of
the human experience. In this chapter, I offer examples of how McQueen’s practice dialogues
with the concerns of those three authors in relationship to the sensus communis.

Part 1. The Body, an End in Itself
With time, the observation that filmmaker Steve McQueen frequently focuses on the
body in his films has become common among journalists and interviewers. The artist, however,
has expressed repeated bewilderment at that observation. In a 2014 interview for his first
Hollywood project, 12 Years a Slave, he responded to the observation in his deadpan affect, by
saying, “well, everybody's using their body in a movie […] I mean, how are they not? I don't
understand the point.”73 In a hypothetical scenario, let’s imagine that the observation was
transformed into a question, “why is the human body so central to the work you do?” and in the
same exasperation he responded, “well, because everybody has one.” Because his first two
feature films, Hunger and Shame not only focus on the human body but also on those human
feelings, one might be tempted to add to McQueen’s response, “everybody feels hunger, and
everybody feels shame.”

Steve McQueen. “Steve McQueen: My Hidden Shame” Interview by Decca Aitkenhead. The Guardian, Jan 4,
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/jan/04/steve-mcqueen-my-painful-childhood-shame.
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Any number of examples threaten to counter that assertion; On the current tv series
Succession, when a high-level executive of a news network is threatened to be exposed for
demanding that her newscasters report on the U.S president in a specific way that pleases the
owners, the newscaster asks “what if I go public with this [it would be] incredibly embarrassing
for you,” she answers, referring to her family who owns the media company, “the thing about
us, and you should know this by now, is we don’t get embarrassed.”74 Though the show is
fictitious she and her family members are archetypes of real people, who are incredibly powerful
and not in small part due to their lack of shame. The same goes for hunger; probably most people
have felt hunger, even if not for a lack of resources, but one could argue that the hunger one feels
when one does not have access to food, certainly is of a different type than the hunger of Bobby
Sands, the real-life character of McQueen’s film, who died of a politically and morally motivated
hunger strike. Everyone’s experience of life is different and being capable of feeling something
does not mean in fact feeling it, and it certainly does not mean communicating or acting
according to feeling. Sensus communis is a feeling in a philosophical sense, it is not a physical
response of the body and it is not an emotion; it is a capacity that, according to Kant, all humans
have, in principle. Like any capacity, it does not come as a presupposition that everybody
effectively experiences it, and in fact, it has nothing to do with experience, mental or otherwise;
it is not a conclusion drawn from life.
All three authors agree on the fact that the aesthetic experience is reducible neither to a
cognitive nor to an ethical activity; in that sense it is autonomous. Both Arendt and Lyotard refer
to sensus communis as spontaneous, and Lyotard specifically devotes much of his text to baring
the pre-cognitive aspect of the idea. “Lack of preparation is the very fact of my subject, sensus
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communis, because it demands it. It demands that the intellect be at a loss. That it have got
nothing ready. Without a show of readiness of which it is incapable because it is a spontaneous
activity.” Lyotard says, adding at another moment “with the question of this sense we are, in
particular, at the confines of literature and philosophy, of art and philosophy.” 75
For Kant the object of the aesthetic judgement was natural beauty, beauty in nature.
Beauty in art could never yield a pure aesthetic judgement because art implied rules. Lyotard
does not focus on the distinction between natural and artistic beauty, and when he writes, “art at
its basis belongs to nature, and […] subjective nature is at bottom art,”76 he refers to Kant’s
theory of genius whereby nature gives the rule to art. De Duve for his part has argued on the
basis of the history of art between Kant’s time and Duchamp’s time that the sentence “this is art”
can replace the sentence “this is beautiful” as a paradigm of the modern aesthetic judgement.
Since Arendt’s focus is on the political aspect of Kant’s philosophy, she does not justify the
substitution of art for nature, but nevertheless leaves it implicit that they are interchangeable.
What matters in the discord between McQueen and the Guardian journalist is that there is a
question implicit in the journalist’s statement that is never stated clearly. The unuttered question
being “why is the body so central to the work that you do?” seems to provoke in the artist
another question in response; we can imagine him saying, “what of the fact that my work focuses
on the body? Where are you trying to get at?”
Returning to that anecdote, “the problem” that McQueen has with the term, the journalist
observes, “turns out to be the phrase ‘the body.’ He thinks it sounds pretentious.”77 A more
provocative reading of McQueen’s response, then, would be that the pretentiousness that
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McQueen associates with the term the body is its contrived nature, which indicates a potential
allegiance to something beyond the work itself.
Lyotard concludes his remarks with something of a warning: “The sensus must be
protected from anthropoligization” He means that there should be no equivalence made between
sensus communis - and any practical applications: The direct, literal, translation of a mental
faculty to concrete forms of social life. In other words, just because humans may have the ability
of “placing [themselves] at the standpoint of others”78 and of “comparing our judgment with the
possible […] judgments of others,”79 does not mean that we can assume to have the consent of
others, whether collectively or individually, to take any practical action on their behalf. “It
should not be said either,” Lyotard states, “that we will move from feeling to concepts, from art
to philosophy, from sensus communis to intellectus communis, which is the I think. For this move
doesn't exist. There is no transition here between reflection and determination.” And he is even
more blunt in his warning, “how many illusions or political crimes have been able to nourish
themselves with this pretended immediate sharing of feelings?”80 The sensus communis is not a
means to an end. Even if it did only pertain to aesthetic judgements, it would not be “a matter of
social consensus, and even less of one obtained by ballot. The beautiful doesn't get elected like
Miss World.” And though Lyotard emphasizes what it is not, namely, a means to an end, he also
states what it is, an end in itself.
It is in this light that I believe the meaning of McQueen’s response (and his practice
implicitly) lies. Later, when the Guardian journalist suggests the word “physicality” instead of
“body,” McQueen says, "yes, the physicality, the body – maybe, like, the art is the body. I
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suppose that's right." In Kantian theory, the aesthetic judgement is uniquely positioned among
other types of judgement as being disinterested; it does not “have knowledge of its end,” it is
“blind to every end,” Lyotard says. “This feeling,” he continues, “[…] when it is a question of
tasting beauty, is precisely a feeling of pleasure, but a pleasure which doesn't come to fill up a
lack nor to fulfil any desire at all. A pleasure before any desire. This aesthetic pleasure is not the
purpose of a purposiveness experienced (or not experienced) beforehand as desire. It has nothing
whatsoever to do with an end or purpose. It is finality.”81
When, finally, McQueen assents to the word “physicality,” suggesting that “the art is the
body,” he seems to encompass that sentiment. He seems to acquiesce only when an external end
is eliminated. However, that is only half of the issue. Earlier I argued that the reason McQueen is
seen as a formalist is because of the indivisibility of meaning and form in his work. I argued
simultaneously that all form has meaning, so that this nomenclature carries with it other nonaesthetic factors. Nevertheless, I am now stating that the idea of the work being an end in itself,
the very indivisibility of form and content, are uniquely characteristic of McQueen’s work and of
the way he sees it. That leaves the other non-aesthetic factors to be explained. I argued that the
reason “formalism” and “identity,” the two terms most often associated with McQueen, are
embattled is because of what they represent culturally. From the point of view of those who align
themselves with “identity,” formalism became a metonym for the dreaded “universal voice,” and
as such, something to be avoided. If these political and cultural markers are deconstructed, then
the two terms, identifying aesthetic and ethical concerns, become capable of qualifying the same
work with less contradiction, as in McQueen’s case.
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In his reading of sensus communis, Lyotard is intent on dismantling the very idea of a
universal voice. As we will see further with de Duve and Arendt this is because it is not the
subject - what Arendt would call the actor, or artist - that determines the voice of the aesthetic
judgment but the very judgement itself, which occurs as if it were universal. But first Lyotard
must insist on the previous point, that the aesthetic judgement “Is not given apodictically, as the
conclusion of a piece of reasoning, but as an example, always singular, for a rule or norm of
aesthetical feeling to which everyone should give their consent, but which always remains to be
found; which is never found.”82
Lyotard is the one to say “which is never found,” giving his reading more than any of
three writers the hue of poetics; this is not about practical application. What I would call a
pragmatist twist, is the very distortion of this idea, where the sensus, so antithetical to the
rational process of fulfilling an end, is distorted into a mere tool, to the effect that an artwork
becomes a collection of concepts rather than of judgements, and the concepts are then subjected
as it is their nature to an end external to themselves, while the aesthetic experience, the
experience of art, is lost.
At the same time, barring an immediate intuition of McQueen’s position, or an extensive,
if speculative, argumentation, as above, it would be natural at a first moment to be confused by
the artist’s discomfort with a seemingly plain observation. McQueen’s work does in fact focus
with unique and engaged energy on the material experience of the human body. His earlier works
Bear (1993) and Cold Breath (1999), which had already garnered him recognition were followed
by the very acclaimed Hunger (2008) and then Shame (2011) and are all uniquely engaged with
the human body: Its sensuality, its sensuousness, its eroticism, all of its conductivity of emotions
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as well as its politicalness and its ability to feel, represent and act in society. All the while he was
nevertheless also producing notable works that are drawn by other focuses; the sound and texture
of the city, in Drumroll (1998), modern icons in Static (2009), current events in Grenfell (2017),
none of which feature or directly implicate the human body, even if arguments for its
metaphorical or implicit presence can always be made.
Many of McQueen’s works of the 1990’s made the artist’s body an important element,
featuring him in front of the camera. In Deadpan (1997), “based on the iconic hurricane scene in
Buster Keaton’s 1928 film Steamboat Bill, Jr., in which the title character (played by Keaton)
stands in front of a house as its facade, detached by strong winds, collapses around him,” 83 the
artist makes a rare move in his oeuvre by reproducing a scene from a work that is not his own.
He replaces Keaton who was white, with himself in the short film (reproducing one scene of the
feature film original), and in making that the main (but not only) modification, he uses his own
body to racialize a situation otherwise devoted to seemingly non-political humor. The scene, also
changed by McQueen’s solemn expression and deliberate choice to isolate that moment,
becomes a metaphor with political import. Indeed, within the post-colonial structure, race
functions as a central element of cultural and economic domination and dispute and is therefore a
matter of public importance; it is political in this way, even if it is not inherently so. This last
fact, that it is systemically political but not inherently so, is something that should never be taken
for granted. Nevertheless, what this pretentious term the body seems to conceal, is the very precognitive way, as Lyotard world put it, in which we make aesthetic judgements and have
aesthetic experiences. In this case, being in a body, a human body, and being a human on earth as
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Arendt would describe the subject of aesthetic judgements, would be an a priori condition. This
happens before we are aware of our identities, or have apperceptions, before we think; Lyotard
would say this happens spontaneously. We should never forget that the aesthetic judgment is
characterized by being the only kind of judgement that we make without interest.
Nevertheless, the clear racial aspect of this work, and others, is one reason why McQueen
became associated with terms of identity. He deliberately introduces his own body, knowing that
it will automatically reinforce the racial (systematically political) aspects of the work, rather than
mark the difference between form and meaning, it reveals a formal decision that produces
meaning in its wake. However, even in that explicit engagement, many concerns are
simultaneously at play, if for no other reason because he coopts a readymade of sorts, but one
that is in kind with his work and his medium, a classic scene from film history, already in film
language, so to speak, rather than an object with utilitarian purpose. Alongside his warning to not
anthropologize the term, Lyotard states that because the “community of faculties in the
knowledge of the beautiful” is spontaneous, “free, and rather out of breath […], one of its
implications is that we can wait without undue worry for this 'death of art' prophesized by the
philosophies of the concept.” However, he warns crucially, “this does not mean that there is
nothing to think about on this subject, especially when conceptual computable syntheses invade
and occupy the field of art's materials and the domain of their forms.”84 That is to say when art
deals with and in concepts, rather than aesthetics.
Later, in Cold Breath (1999) McQueen would again touch on the subject of skin color as
race, this time almost seeking to exhaust the myriad of connotations that skin as well as skin tone
can have. In addition to its social implications, skin appears to the spectator as the human body’s
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largest organ, the barrier between our organism and the outside world, and the vehicle of touch,
one of our five senses, through which we occasionally experience the world aesthetically. Skin is
simultaneously erotic, traumatic, aesthetic and political.
The ten-minute, 16 mm, black-and-white, silent film captures the body of the artist
repeating a specific action. For almost the entirety of its duration it frames the left side of his
bare chest and records a single action that is repeated multiple times; McQueen uses his hand to
rub, flick and occasionally pinch his own nipple. A few minutes into the repetition of this action,
a viscous liquid that looks like spit falls onto the nipple from outside of the frame as the action of
the hand continues, now lubricated by the liquid. Both the experience of watching and the
description of the action evoke a sense of eroticism. However, as the action extends and repeats,
the once soft and sensual action begins to change, and another feeling of discomfort surfaces.
Once or twice the frame shifts and parts of McQueen’s face become visible, reducing the
disembodiment of the action but offering little more information. His face presents no clear
expression to connote emotion or a sense of narrative, while there is perhaps enough to show that
the person seems to be a cis-gendered Black man, and, if the spectator is familiar with his
features, that it is the artist. At the same time, McQueen’s skin tone is depicted with as much
subtlety as possible. The film he uses is black-and-white and low contrast, the background is
dark and the lighting is rather dim and uniform. Together, they create an image rich in grey hues
rather than high-contrast black and white. To compound this effect, the tight frame reduces the
amount of visual information, so that the variation in hues mostly belongs to the organic
landscape formed by McQueen’s own skin.
The work has the synthetic simplicity of late modernist and early minimalist works. If it
is not a direct citation, as Deadpan is of Buster Keaton’s film, it vividly recalls Richard Serra’s

45

famous incursion into film, Hand Catching Lead. In that three-minute, 16 mm, black-and-white,
silent film from 1968, Serra also focuses on one body part and one motion, the hand and its
grabbing gesture. In it, an immovable frame shows the artist’s hand and forearm extended
horizontally to the middle of the picture as rectangular pieces of lead fall from above. While his
limb remains still, his hand opens and closes mechanically, sometimes grabbing and scrunching
the pieces, sometimes missing them, and then letting them go in regular intervals, as the metal
progressively darkens and sullies his hands. Serra’s film speaks of the effect of the body on the
material and the effect of the material on the body. The relationship between the human body
and the material world is a central tenet of minimalism, and the work’s economy of elements,
like in many of Serra’s works, facilitates a clear communication of this tenet. Thinking of this
economy of form and clarity of content, there is no question that McQueen’s works take a great
deal from the modernist avant-gardes and that the shift of concerns is likewise made evident by
this comparison.
Unlike Serra’s film, the actions and the materials in Cold Breath all pertain to the human
body. The action observed is from the body onto the body, and the quick but sure pan up to
reveal the face no doubt calls attention to its psychic presence. It is also clear that a disembodied
limb, as Serra’s hand is, in Hand Catching Lead, is less subject to pathos. By towing this fine
line between giving the body pathos and exploring its aesthetic aspects, McQueen creates a space
of connection, where it can at the same time aspire to universality and celebrate its inescapable
specificity.
Part 2. The Body, Objectified
The prologue of this thesis is a scene from a horror movie, literally; a movie called The
Dark and the Wicked. The cause of its horror is absolute solitude, alienation of the deepest kind,
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the separation of a person from any meaningful connection with other human beings. Like the
Philip Guston anecdote told in this introduction, it speaks of its time, a moment where the fear of
alienation, of loss of community and its observable effects seem to be increasingly palpable
across the most varied sectors of cultural and economic life. However, this horror is not
exclusive to this time, it is transcendental. Human beings are social beings, and they need
community in the broad sense. Hannah Arendt’s reading of Kant’s Third Critique runs first and
foremost through this idea; that is why in the second lesson of the thirteen she devoted to it, she
read in its entirety, the horror narrated by Kant of the very same nature as the one from the
prologue. It is as follows:
[Carazan’s Dream] In proportion as his riches increased, this wealthy miser had closed off
his heart from compassion and love toward all others. Meantime, as the love of man grew
cold in him, the diligence of his prayer and his religious observances increased. After this
confession, he goes on to recount the following: “one evening, as by my lamp I drew up
my accounts and calculated my profits, sleep overpowered me. And this day I saw the
Angel of death come over me like a whirlwind. He struck me before I could plead to be
spared his terrible stroke. I was petrified, as I perceived that my destiny throughout eternity
was cast, and that to all the good I had done nothing could be added, and from all the evil
I had committed, not a thing could be taken away. I was led before the throne of him who
dwells in the third heaven. The glory that flamed before me spoke to me thus: ‘Carazan,
your service of God is rejected. You have closed your heart to the love of man, and have
clutched your treasures with an iron grip. You have lived only for yourself, and therefore
you shall also live the future in eternity alone and removed from all communion with the
whole of creation.’ At this instant I was swept away by an unseen power, and driven
through the shining edifice of creation. I soon left countless worlds behind me. As I neared
the outermost end of nature, I saw the shadows of the boundless void sink down into the
abyss before me. A fearful Kingdom of eternal silence, loneliness, and darkness!
Unutterable horror overtook me at this sight. I gradually lost sight of the last star, and
finally the last glimmering ray of light was extinguished in outer darkness! The mortal
terrors of despair increased with every moment, just as every moment increased my
distance from the last inhabited world. I reflected with unbearable anguish that if ten
thousand times a thousand years more should have carried me along beyond the bounds of
all the universe I would still always be looking ahead into the infinite abyss of darkness,
without help or hope of any return. In this bewilderment I thrust out my hands with such
force toward the objects of reality that I awoke. And now I have been taught to esteem
mankind; For in that terrifying solitude I would have preferred even the least of those whom
in the pride of my fortune I had turned from my door to all the treasures of Golkonda.85
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In this tale,86 hell is solitude, much like the solitude the protagonist of the prologue
experiences when an evil force finally comes for her soul after her last human connection she has
is severed. Though I have called it a tale, Arendt, and Kant himself would call the above
narrative a “thought-experiment” so that this hell is not only metaphorical, but also tries to
reproduce the mental experience of absolute isolation from a philosophical perspective. Arendt
states plainly that “no man can live alone, men are interdependent not merely in their needs and
cares but in their highest faculty, the human mind, which will not function outside human
society.” She claims that two questions left from Kant’s earlier writings permeate the Third
Critique. The first is “man’s sociability,” and the second is man’s purposiveness: “Why is it
necessary that we exist?”87 In short, the philosophical solution to the second question would be
that “as a moral being, [man] is an end in himself.” However, the beings of which Kant speaks
are not always the same ones: “The distinctions among these three perspectives are a necessary
precondition for an understanding of Kant. Whenever he speaks of man, one must know whether
he is speaking of the human species; or of the moral being, the rational creature that may also
exist in other parts of the universe; or of men as actual inhabitants of the earth.”88
Since Arendt is concerned with politics, the “center of [her] considerations” is the last
perspective, that of men as inhabitants of the earth. Therefore, the question of man’s sociability
(more a statement than a question) permeates her readings of, and interest in, the aesthetic
judgement; it also explains her understanding of the sensus communis. In Arendt’s reading,
Kant’s subject of aesthetic judgement is men in the plural, “earthbound creatures, living in
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communities, endowed with common sense, sensus communis, a community sense.” And of men
from this perspective, Arendt writes that their “true ‘end’ is sociability.” Therefore, we can
conclude that in an isolated state, men - human beings on earth - cannot exercise their most
important function, the mind; they become less human. If we are looking from a capitalist lens,
we can say that they become objectified, perhaps.
In late 2020, amidst the COVID 19 pandemic, an Instagram account called Stooping
NYC89 became very popular with some New Yorkers and even people in other American states.
Shunning sponsored content and adhering to a set of ethical guidelines, two anonymous
moderators shared all kinds of items that New York City dwellers no longer wanted and had put
on their stoops free for taking by anyone who found them. From expensive furniture to art,
clothes, and sometimes even food, these items, whose owners had sometimes barely used and
were unwilling or unable to sell, were put on the streets, oftentimes accompanied by signs
explaining what they were and that they were being given away. Gaining repercussion in the
local and national media, Stooping NYC became a community in its own right centered around
upcycling and a sense of collectivity, and united by a bond with the city.
One day, the account’s moderators posted on the timeline a photo of a mannequin that
had been discarded on a Manhattan sidewalk next to trash bags and other lose trash. The
mannequin, whose top half had been covered by a black plastic bag, was placed in a horizontal
position on the ground. In a voice typical of the platform, the moderators gave the photo a
supposedly humorous caption, which said something like “I hope your day goes better than this
mannequin’s.”90 Unfortunately, rather than the more common flat white plastic or fabric
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material, the mannequin’s surface was finished in a somewhat realistic skin tone and, most
notably, the tone was a warm brown. The post immediately received a flood of critical
comments, pointing out that the image came across as insensitive or even racist. That in showing
a brown body, even if it was a mannequin, discarded as trash and accompanied by a funny
subtitle, the post was offensive and disregardful of the lives of people of color. The debacle was
immediately followed by the deletion of the post and profuse apologies by the still anonymous
moderators.
For those familiar with McQueen’s photographic series, Barrage, there may be some sort
of strange resonance between the image in the Stooping NYC post and the images in the series.
Barrage, from 1997, was another one of the works shown in the ICA London retrospective in
1999. The description from Thomas Dane Gallery, his European representatives, reads as
follows.
Being the earliest, as well as one of few photographic bodies of work by Steve McQueen,
the series Barrage emerged in the course of several stays in Paris. While walking the streets
McQueen’s attention was drawn not to the historical façades or tourist attractions of the
city, but to the gutter. Strange, string-tied bundles of rags, lying on the street between
pavement and traffic lane, form barriers [barrage] […] an ancient and simple means used
by Parisian street sweepers. […] The cropped and serial photography reveals how even the
most unprepossessing things can be transformed into a visual event when seen through the
attentive eyes of a viewer with a formalist turn of mind.91
The activity of looking at trash from a different perspective is familiar to the community
of “stoopers” whose motto is “one person’s trash is another one’s treasure.” The gallery’s
statement grants McQueen’s different perspective to his “formalist turn of mind.” In making the
series McQueen placed the bundles of trash in the center of the frame and with little visual noise
around them, just enough information so as to show what the object is, varied grouped materials

“Caption for the Barrage series images,” Thomas Dane Gallery Website, accessed December 10, 2022,
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tied by a string, and where it is, lying in the asphalt curb of a city street. Given the time of day in
which the photographs were taken, the early morning when these bundles were set out to be
collected, the lighting is typically even and soft. The fact that it is a series helps the viewer
understand that the objects are not products of an isolated event; though they are all different,
they also share some inherent commonality that defines them. The result is that the pictures have
an almost tender quality, and the trash bundles are captured with the affect of a portrait. The fact
that the gallery’s statement does not mention the incredible and haunting anthropomorphic aspect
of these bundles as photographed by McQueen is strange; other writers certainly have.
The description only makes mention of the “formalist”92 aspects of the work, consciously
perpetuating the association of the term with McQueen, and also perpetuating the idea that a
formalist work cannot also have political and moral content. The anthropomorphic quality,
inevitably morbid, is at the core of the series, intentionally connecting through the eeriness of the
images, the disposability and objectification with which the human body can be treated in a socalled developed93 society. Analogously, the reverse question, “which objects or people are
granted the status of human?” is also evoked. Many critics and audiences would also rightly
point out the disproportionate frequency with which non-white people are treated inhumanely
versus white ones; it was of neglecting this that the Instagram post was accused. However, other
critical modes would mourn the commodification and objectification of the human condition in
general, regardless of (or in addition to) factors of identity. It is increasingly evident how many
factors are inextricably linked in the oppression and violence against the less powerful and of
how little humanity is granted to people simply for being human. In Barrage all of these
possibilities seem viable and put into question.
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Evidently, Barrage preceded the world of Instagram by many years, but it already
recognized the ways in which seemingly quotidian images are imbued with meaning, and
furthermore that any object can contain the basis of aesthetic regard as well as of political
impetus. If in Cold Breath McQueen invited spectators to regard the Black body and any body,
as human, in Barrage he invites them to regard the material world as reflective of human
experience. In this sense he takes the form-as-content approach to a further place, acknowledging
that whether one is conscientious or not, no aesthetic experience is neutral, be it that of a
discarded mannequin or a bundle of trash.
Comparing the two instances, one a joke turned into fiasco and the other an effective
aesthetic exercise, one might wonder why a similar image can have such opposite impacts on
their audience. How does one control the effect of a message, the nuance with which it is
received, and the integrity that it retains in its reception? Another example, the Philip Guston
controversy described in the introduction, suggests that the answer hinges on knowing who the
receiving public of the message is. The “message” here is used loosely, it can simply be the
elusive essence of a work of art. However, in cases where the art deals with historical facts that
contain political implications, as is the case of some of Philip Guston’s paintings and many of
Steve McQueen’s works, the integrity of this message can have more serious consequences. The
ability to communicate successfully with an audience, to get an idea across, engage interest, and
raise questions, without eliciting a degree of backlash so overwhelming that it obliterates any
possibility of conversation, may hinge on answering this question: Who determines the audience
of a work of art and how?
Although Lyotard is avidly against a practical reading of the sensus communis, as
Arendt’s is, he constructs a similar inquiry. He wonders about Kant’s use of the German term
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Stimme, which means voice, and which is introduced but unexplained in the philosopher’s text.
"The beautiful must be declared in one single voice, in a chorus,” Lyotard says, “[…] What
voice, what voices are concerned here? Whose are this or these voices?” The voice that he
wonders about is the voice of those who utter aesthetic judgements, therefore not necessarily
those who make art but those who judge it, the audience, the spectators, the public. Each of the
three writers contribute differently to the idea. De Duve asserts that the artwork is a result of
aesthetic judgements made by the actor (the artist) and he speaks about this voice in terms of
mandate and address. Lyotard’s reading is strongly against athropologizing the idea of sensus
communis, while Arendt’s is openly political, (and therefore inherently anthropological). Even
so, the three readings often converge. Semantically, the term voice is active, typically associated
with the maker while audience would naturally have a passive role. However, while it is an
active term, both Arendt and Lyotard assign voice to the subject who judges, giving it an active
role. Lyotard only goes so far as to call the judging subject a community of faculties. Arendt
however, states clearly that the public sphere is composed by the voices of the judging audience,
where its agency prevails.
Arendt was extremely well versed in German philosophy and was a German philosopher
herself despite having emigrated to the United States after the second word war as an intellectual
of widespread recognition. According to her, one of the most significant contributions of Kant’s
third critique regards the question of audience and threatens to subvert its premise. She
associates with Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgement a political philosophy which is essentially
bound by one idea: The public sphere. “The public realm is constituted by the critics and the
spectators, not by the actors or the makers” because although not everyone is gifted with genius,
i.e., the ability to communicate and make, everyone is gifted with the ability to judge. At the
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same time, “this critic and spectator sits in every actor and fabricator; without this critical,
judging faculty the doer or maker would be so isolated from the spectator that he would not even
be perceived.”94 De Duve also agrees that the artist is gifted with the ability to judge, and he
argues further that the act of making art is itself constituted by a series of aesthetic judgements.
A moral judgment, Arendt explains, “might be communicated, but this communication is
secondary; even if they could not be communicated, they would remain valid.” This is not the
case for an aesthetic judgement. “Communicability is the condition sine qua non for the
existence of beautiful objects.” Therefore, community first constitutes the realm of the aesthetic
judgement, which is the public realm, and communicability establishes its condition. The
beautiful is not a verifiable truth: “One can only ‘woo’ or ‘court’ the agreement of everyone
else,” she says. This agreement would be that of an aesthetic judgment i.e., ‘this is beautiful’ or,
in its more contemporary version, ‘this is art.’ “In this persuasive activity,” Arendt continues,
“one actually appeals to the ‘community sense.’ In other words, when one judges, one judges as
a member of a community.”95 The artist, therefore in making his work communicable, depends
on the simple existence of a judging community; without it, the interplay that asks, ‘is this art?’
cannot exist.
It is at this point that the question is gently subverted; rather than only asking where the
artist’s role is in addressing a target audience, we can also ask what allows for a community to
form and therefore give voice to a judging audience. Arendt suggests one direction for this
answer. As an enlightened philosopher, as the enlightened philosopher to many writers, Kant
understood that there was a world community and that “one is a member of the world community
by the sheer fact of being human; this is one's ‘cosmopolitan existence.’” However, the
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importance in nuancing the contrast of Lyotard and Arendt lies here. Arendt is all but a naïve
thinker and her reading is highly aware of the pitfalls of a literal interpretation of philosophical
concepts. She is attentive to the fact that neither the idea of a sensus communis nor of this world
community are unanimously adopted ideas that consistently rule social behavior. To that effect,
she continues, “when one judges and when one acts in political matters, one is supposed to take
one's bearings from the idea, not the actuality, 96 of being a world citizen and therefore, also a
Welbetrachter, a world spectator.”97
The mistake that happens with the idea of a judging community is similar to the mistake
that happens with the term formalism: They are treated as impoverished oversimplifications of
themselves. The dangers of pretending that there is a community that possesses universal
authority is obvious. The job of the philosopher, as Kant would posit and Arendt would teach, is
to ask among other things “what can I hope for?” Recent history shows that loss of collective
sentiments also leads to scary outcomes. The deterioration that is spoken about here is, thus, of
this latter kind. This deterioration is of the idea that being human can be ground enough for a
sense of community; the possibility that people have a sensus communis, the possibility of
checking our experience of the world against the potential experience of others; the very
capability of being able to hold together the idea of a self that lives amongst others. If horrific
coercions can happen as the result of a community claiming false legitimacy over others, another
horror beckons if the possibility of any community on the basis of a shared humanity is
extinguished.
Part 3. The Body, Universal
“God must come to Mexico in a blanket and in huaraches, else he is no God of the Mexicans,
they cannot know him. Naked, all men are but man. But the touch, the look, the word that goes
96
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from one naked man to another is the mystery of living. We live by manifestations. […]
Different peoples must have different Saviors, as they have different speech and different colour.
The final mystery is one mystery. But the manifestations are many.”
Don Ramón in The Plumed Serpent by D.H. Lawrence

By now a main idea has hopefully been established: There is danger in treating
possibilities as actualities but there is also danger in eliminating ideas as possibilities altogether.
Aiming for perfection may have led humanity to create beautiful things; claiming to have
achieved it - the perfect Aryan human provided the logic behind the Holocaust - or achieving it
to some degree - Artificial intelligence becoming a form of “intelligent life” whose only purpose
is self-perpetuation – may lead to the worst outcomes. The idea of God, even in its most
aspirational form, and acting as God are fundamentally different. Analogously, there is no
universal or perfect body; but, as McQueen shows, the human body can provide a pathway to
stimulate shared feelings, to imagine unity against irreconcilable division.
By his own assertion, Thierry de Duve’s interpretation of sensus communis falls
somewhere between the poetic and abstract reading of Jean François Lyotard and the political
and practical reading of Hannah Arendt. In this concluding part, I wish to briefly explain how de
Duve’s reading offers another perspective upon which to look at Steve McQueen’s works and
finally suggest that McQueen himself, though never to my knowledge explicitly speaking of the
sensus communis, also contributes to the idea in his own right.
McQueen’s exploration of the body as politically charged and conducive to pathos is
reflected in Girls, Tricky in 2001. The year it was filmed, the Bristolian musical artist Tricky,
who is its subject of attention, was thirty-three years old and the September 11th attack on the
Twin Towers in New York had just happened. The 14 minutes, 27 seconds long color-video film
captures the musician in the recording studio improvising on one of his songs, Girls. From what
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sometimes feels like impossibly close, the fluid camera records the man at work, moving in
rhythm with him. The source of light is sometimes unclear, and the scene is dim. Behind the
musician a soft white light gives the space an imprecise sense of depth; what at times reads as a
long and narrow, horizontal-rectangular window at other times impresses the eye as a flat,
abstract white shape. Depending on how Tricky moves, the rectangle disappears completely, and
the viewer is left only with a dense black background against which his head and upper torso
swing back and forth in a slow but agitated trance.
Tricky’s body, slender and muscular, pulsing with contained energy, is unclad from the
waste up and, as an ambiguous, red-tinted light sensuously illuminates his body, the sheen of
sweat glimmers against his skin. Over his ears are a pair of large professional headphones with a
white patina, luster in the dark and contrast against his darker skin; in front of him a sleek
standing microphone is raised to his mouth; he touches it as he vocalizes; most of the time, the
man and his tools are all that are visible, except when in a different frame a small team,
presumably of sound engineers, appear behind a glass in the distance.
The pre-recorded soundtrack against which he sings plays in the background as if at a
distance and in low-quality, the basic notes of the chorus repeating in an exciting pattern. In the
foreground of sound, Tricky’s voice, as un-retouched as the rest of the recording, rushes coarsely
and vehemently through the sound isolated space. His eyes, sometimes closed, sometimes
glancing into the thick wall of darkness in front of him, don’t look at anything external. In
intervals, against heavy breathing, he sometimes takes a drag from what looks like a joint.
Girls, Tricky shows a performer who doesn’t seem to be performing at all - so absorbed is
he in his moment of creation –and a camera movement so seamless that it appears that the device
and the man could occupy the same space without clashing. The mediation between recording
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device and actual space seems to disappear. Rather than a hermetic scene meant for detached
observation, the film seems to absorb the viewer into contact with it. The space feels small, in an
extremely intimate but inviting way, enveloping the spectator into the action.
*
The book that figures many of de Duve’s reflections on Kant, progress, the development
of contemporary art, and the sensus communis is titled Aesthetics at Large: Art, Ethics, Politics.
In an essay of that book, the author makes a distinction between representation and
representativity. Representation would refer to figurative art, and matters more to painting and
sculpture, which had become mostly abstract during modernism. [Though photography and film
can be abstract, they have not tended in that direction as much.] Representativity refers to the
transformation “of artists into standard-bearers for a group, and their works into tokens of
whatever identity that group wished to project.” In the same essay, which is titled “Do Artists
Speak on Behalf of All of Us?” he argues that “what had been precious and politically
progressive in the modernist critique of representation was precisely that it was a critique of
representativity, even though it did not succeed in theorizing itself in those terms.” It is also in
that essay that de Duve lays out his theory of mandate and address, which stems from his
understanding of representativity.
For de Duve, artists and their audience had interacted on the basis of a “tacit and largely
imaginary social contract, dating from the foundation of academies, according to which artists
with aspirations to high art were expected – and expecting! – to make works from within and on
behalf of the cultivated class they were addressing.”98 Think of the early Renaissance, where
academies of artists were established so that masters of their art could teach, as well as benefit
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from the assistance of their students. These academies were regulated by the royal authorities
and later on by the state, who were also the patrons of the majority of the works the academies
produced. The artists at the forefront of the academies, therefore, had a clear understanding of
who they were painting for, and the patrons had a clear sense of their class and influence. De
Duve argues elsewhere that this structure maintained itself implicitly until the art public was
massively expanded throughout the 18th and 19th centuries starting with the establishment of the
modern salon and the disintegration of what had been the patron class up to that point.
He calls “this fantasized social contract” – borne between the court painters and the court
– “the imaginary congruence of mandate and address,” whereupon the painters “were performing
that class’s representation, in both senses of the word: they portrayed it and they were its cultural
deputies, displaying the rituals, pageants, trappings, and values of the court to the court with the
populace watching in awe.”99 As this congruence of making art “mandated by the aristocracy to
address the aristocracy” dissolved, modernist avant-garde artists “imagined themselves mandated
by humanity to address humanity.”100 If we were to phrase the embattlement that I spoke of
before –between formalism as the banner of modernism and identity politics as the banner of
postmodernism – in other terms, it would be these: Whereas modernists “satisfied” themselves
with this universal mandate and address, postmodernists defended a more specific model upon
which only defined communities could “issue” a mandate, and only legitimate members of those
communities could speak on their behalf. It was against this modernist universalism that its
postmodern critiques eventually coalesced, claiming the impossibility of universal mandate or
address. The problem is, as de Duve writes, that modernism did not properly theorize the
“implicit critique of representativity” that would claim that aesthetic judgments are addressed
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universally. Instead, when that textual vacuum was filled, it was done so through “bland
humanism and trite universalism.” To the degree that the modernists and formalists were
responsible for the simplistic reductions of their names, one might argue that it is by their lack of
engagement with the following problem: The tacit acceptance that in the unequal world in which
we live, it was enough to use the already lose ideas of humanism and universalism as the
principles of their communicability, as the mandate of their audience. However, de Duve’s very
text starts from the premise that Kant was correct in asserting the “legitimacy of any pure or true
aesthetic judgement’s claim to universal validity.” Therefore, in recognizing the loss modernism
and formalism suffered, the question is, how can this loss be mended, and the progressive aspects
of their legacies reclaimed?
A fair way to restate the main problem that identity-politics has with universalism is that
it obfuscates the ideology implicit in works of art, and advertises the work as non-ideological and
innocuous. However, de Duve argues, the problem is not whether ideology is part of works of
art, it is whether works of art “claim universal assent.” “Ideological statements [as opposed to art
works] don’t make such claims,” de Duve says, “especially if they are overtly political and seek
the victory of one party over the other.”101 In other words, they inherently presume to not have
universal assent, by their very nature. This is a significant caveat. However, if it is agreed that
aesthetic judgments by their very nature claim universal assent and have universal address, as
Kant argued, then it is precisely and only at the juncture where ideological statements aim at
universal assent that they approach the status of aesthetic judgements. In works where “aesthetic
decisions have the last word” it is “precisely because they beg the approval of others, of an

101

Ibid, 75.

60

indeterminate and thus universal other” de Duve argues, concluding: “If Kant was right, as I am
convinced he was, this means that genuine works of art contain a universal address.”102
De Duve suggests that “signs are appearing here and there” that perhaps other people are
taking the identity-politics “discourse to be mistaken in making universalism the target of its
critique when it should be representativity” and that “representation is no longer the master
concept it was in the nineties.” He mentions among others, a Glenn Ligon essay for Artforum as
evidence. Whether it is true that a resistant community is appearing, or whether individuals like
Glenn Ligon are brilliant exceptions might still be too early to tell. Steve McQueen certainly
seems like a brilliant exception. Either way, the lack of vocabulary, and therefore, of a strong
imagined alternative, persists.
In the case of “multiculturalism as an art genre,” as de Duve puts it, where the
congruence of mandate and address based on limited communities is carried onto the present
time, the problem of the artist and their work’s authority to speak, persists. In that light one could
see the argument in which McQueen would be considered not only to make art about identity but
also that he is a standard-bearer, as de Duve puts it, for his community. I have argued that this
reading is complicated by a number of factors including the significant diversity of his themes
and the communities that he represents- in the formal sense of featuring in front of his lens. This
is further supported by evidence, such as the language he uses, always resisting any type of
group affiliations and focusing his strong political attention on issues that are exclusively bound
by a sense of moral correctness. It is not coincidental, in other words, that the interpretations
about his work struggle to find a place outside of the mistakenly unpolitical formalism and the
eventually limiting scope of identity politics.
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Conclusion
For reasons entirely intimate and personal, this thesis became at times a defense of
Hannah Arendt’s work as well as of Steve McQueen’s. Though part of the debate her work
inspires is a testament to its quality, another part is, I believe, the result of misunderstanding. In
her essays about culture, politics, truth, and aesthetics she gave breath to a humanist sentiment
without the obfuscation sometimes caused by sentimentality, which I believe is also what Steve
McQueen’s work does. Humanism is itself a historied term that I do not introduce to complicate
this text but to bring feeling into a conversation that is precisely about feelings.
Kant’s philosophy marked and defined the enlightenment period, which in objective
historical terms, is a humanist period. There is no coincidence from this point of view that there
is such an intense connection between common sense and sensus communis. For Kant, for
Arendt, for Lyotard, and for de Duve the humanistic values observed in the enlightenment period
must be dear; they must also be, their work suggests, common-sensical in the colloquial sense.
At the same time, these authors were all interested, it seems, in why these values are not
common-sensical for everyone, and were compelled to speak about how and why they should be.
This is why they wrote about sensus communis and why I don’t believe that in their sentiment,
their texts differ.
This is also why Hannah Arendt dedicated significant space in her lecture notes to
explaining the imagination in Kant’s theory. In philosophy, many terms that we use quotidianly
have a proper definition that we are not always aware of but that nevertheless influence our use
of them. That is the case for several terms in this thesis such as the term concept, and the very
term common sense. That is also true for the term imagination. Imagination is both that word
used freely as the quirky trait that children possess, and a precise and essential faculty of the
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mind. Arendt’s explanation of it is strictly Kantian and the deductions she makes from it are
sober and straightforward, but it never ceases to contain the gleam of feeling that only literature
and art can lend to things. Aesthetics sometimes borders on the dry and the technocratic, but it is
after all the study if not of the beautiful, then of the things that cause elusive feelings of passion
and fury, and which resist explanation so obstinately.
Other authors who wrote about Steve McQueen also spoke of imagination, and Frederic
Jameson, who I mentioned in Chapter Two, has the incomparably sharp statement that asks,
“why it is harder to imagine the end of the world than the end of Capitalism?” Jean Fischer
wrote, speaking of McQueen’s ability to produce alternative spaces called heterotopias, that “a
civilization that does not produce heterotopias loses the capacity to dream and imagine.”
When Arendt wrote about imagination, she explained that it is the “faculty of synthesis,”
the faculty unites the other faculties by “‘providing an image for a concept.’ […] called a
schema.” Imagination is what gives people access to enlarged mentalities as Kant would say, the
ability to allow for a point of view beyond one’s own. It is also, crucially, what allows for
communicability, which is for Arendt the a priori condition of the public space, and of man’s
sociability. The schema is the image that one sees in the mind’s eye that allows one person to
know what another means when they say tree, or hand, or knife. From this she deduces, if a little
ambitiously, that “all single agreements or disagreements presuppose that we are talking about
the same thing – that we, who are many, agree, come together, on something that is one in the
same for us all.” 103 In the political moment that we face, of such tender inability to communicate
and even consider the possibility of agreeing with the other, one could comfortably argue that it
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is a failure of imagination, an absolute impoverishment of both our individual and collective
imagination that shorttails our ambitions for a different world.
However, trees, hands, and knifes are concepts and concepts are the objects of
determinate judgements. “Determinate judgements subsume the particular under a general rule;
reflective judgments on the contrary, ‘derive’ the rule form the particular. […] The Critique of
Judgement deals with reflexive judgements.”104 But the imagination, “the same faculty which
provides schemata for cognition, provides examples for judgement,” and Arendt thinks of them
as analogous. Examples allow someone to know what courage means, when their mind brings up
Achilles, or filial duty when one thinks of King Lear.105 The examples lead and guide us and, to
the extent that the example is rightly chosen, they have exemplary validity, she claims.106 The
validity of the examples, Arendt explains, will depend on whether people have experience,
knowledge, and/or belong to the same historical tradition as them.
One could argue then, that examples can be cultivated, and in the sense that they operate
like schemata for communication and mutual understanding they can also offer the possibility of
grasping new things – if we were to return to the starting point, this is the common way that most
people think about imagination. In particular when speaking about art, then, being untethered by
concepts, it can even offer schemata/examples for things that do not yet exist – an alternative to
Capitalism, just as an example. However, differently from the common understanding, this is not
an individual task, but one that provides useful outcomes only when shared with others. I must
therefore return to the space of the spectator in the aesthetic experience/judgement, since it is the
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only space that matters in the public realm, and the space that unites aesthetics and politics,
according to Arendt.
It seems that, uniting aesthetics and politics is precisely what McQueen is doing when he
creates three-dimensional spaces that envelop and invite the viewer, or when he generates
catharsis between the bodies in front of the screen and the bodies in front of his lens, which are
always different bodies; and when, as a result, he questions, who is looking and who is being
looked at. He says, “when we did the movie shame, I stayed in a skyscraper apartment in
Manhattan with floor to ceiling panoramic views. At first it was as if I was looking out onto the
city through telescope but after a while I felt as if the device had been turned around and focused
back on me. All of a sudden I was the thing being examined. It was like a telescope had
transformed into a microscope that was now scrutinizing me.”107 In this sense, he gives answers
to the questions that arise for him by creating new spaces rather than simply discovering them. If
Arendt is right and the aesthetic experience depends on a community with the ability to share
feelings, then McQueen effectively provides a way for these communities to form within his
work, uniting the imagined and the real, as Jean Fischer might begin to suggest.
Steve McQueen justly asks that his work not be read as an interpretation of theory, and
that is essentially the argument I have tried to make here: That art performs a task, or better,
contains its own form of purposiveness, as Kant says, a purposiveness that no other object or
concept is capable of. It would be false and unfair, then, to equate philosophical concepts to
aspects of McQueen’s work. What I have tried to show instead, is that his work embodies and
gives life to the idea that ethical political behavior can be conjured into the practical world
through the aspects of the human mind, namely the feelings, that are often considered
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superfluous to those activities; that politics, as Arendt argued, is the public realm of human
interactions and that it cannot be purged of feelings. Therefore, there is nothing contradictory in
an artwork – object of a judgment by feeling appealing to sensus communis – that concerns itself
with political issues, or ethical issues, and that simultaneously concerns itself with its own form.
In other words, there is no contradiction between a work that considers identity politics, or any
other politics and is at the same time formalist. The sooner we embrace this idea the sooner we
will have works of art that feel pertinent to the world that we live in and to the world that we
imagine we want.
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